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THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION: 
PECULIARITIES OF CREDIT MARKET 
ANALYSIS
Before turning to corporate lending developments in the 
CEE region, it is important to describe certain peculiarities 
of the credit markets, which make analysis of credit market 
processes and their effects on the real economy rather 
complicated. The main problem in the credit market is that 
prices cannot always fulfil their market clearing function, 
and thus supply and demand effects are extremely difficult 
to distinguish.
The role of prices and non-price credit conditions
According to the traditional competitive market approach, 
price plays a vital role in the functioning of the market as a 
whole. In a normal competitive market, the quantity 
demanded and the quantity supplied reach an equilibrium 
through price adjustment; therefore, price typically contains 
all relevant information based on which consumers and 
producers can make decision. This does not necessarily hold 
true to the credit market. The (effective) interest rate on a 
loan is typically considered as the price of a loan. However, 
while in the classical case buyers intend to buy exactly the 
same amount of products at a given market price as the 
suppliers wish to sell (and vice versa), this is not necessarily 
the case in the credit market. Indeed, in our analysis of 
“ c o r p o r a t e  l o an s ”  w e  ar e  f o r c e d  t o  l o o k  a t  a  “ c o r p o r a t e  
loan” as though it were a homogenous product. In point of 
fact, however, corporate loans are rather heterogeneous 
products; with a slight exaggeration one might say that no 
two loans are exactly the same, as no two companies are 
exactly the same either. Just like analysts, risk managers at 
banks also face the difficult task of distinguishing these 
products from one another, and they only succeed to a 
limited degree. Therefore, banks are not in a position to 
behave as “normal” sellers; they cannot extend a loan to 
anyone who is willing to pay the relevant interest rate, 
b e c a u s e  t h a t  w o u l d  b e  t a n t a m o u n t  t o  o f f e r i n g  t w o ,  
potentially fundamentally different products at the same 
price. Vice-versa, this implies that, upon determining their 
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credit supply, banks take into consideration factors other 
than prices as well.2 As a result, a future debtor must also 
comply with additional, non-price credit conditions as well 
(e.g. providing collateral for the loan; demonstrating a 
certain level of regular income or revenues, etc.). Banks 
impose non-price conditions in the course of the debtor 
classification process – known as ‘rating’ for corporate loans 
– conducted prior to granting a loan. They examine the 
information available on the firm as well as its finances; 
they assess the probability of its becoming insolvent and 
decide whether to provide credit and if so, under what 
conditions (in terms of collateral and other factors), and at 
what price. Consequently, analysis of these credit aggregates 
which are composed of heterogeneous products reveals that, 
while certain businesses or customers are willing to borrow 
at a specific (average) interest rate level, banks may still 
decide not to grant loans: hence, the observed interest rate 
is not necessarily identical to the market-clearing price. 
Thus, if banks wish to reduce their credit supply they have 
other means at their disposal, in addition to tightening 
interest rates; indeed, beyond a certain point raising their 
rates is not even in their interest. This is because investing 
firms must resort to riskier projects to raise the funds 
required to cover the increased borrowing costs, and 
consequently, higher interest rates would eventually increase 
the ratio of less creditworthy, riskier customers in the bank’s 
portfolio. Therefore, banks will not raise their interest rates 
beyond a certain level, but rather start tightening their non-
price credit conditions instead (this phenomenon is referred 
to as credit rationing in the literature; for further details see 
Stiglitz–Weiss, 1981).
As a consequence, changes in interest rates cannot be clearly 
attributed to a decline in supply or a decline in demand. 
While a classical negative supply shock – a steep decline in 
supply – will inevitably generate a price increase for the 
relevant product in a normal market, it can trigger any kind 
of shift in the interest rates of the credit market. Conceivably, 
1) interest rates may increase while non-price credit conditions 
r e m a i n  u n c h a n g e d  o r  t i g h t e n ;  o r  2 )  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  r e m a i n  
unchanged and only the credit conditions tighten (banks 
restrain their credit supply by offering the loan at the same 
price but only to selected customers – the “flight to quality” 
phenomenon, see Bernanke et al., 1996); or, in more extreme 
cases, observed interest rates may in fact decline, while credit 
conditions are severely tightened (banks extend loans – rather 
cheaply – only to customers with the best credit rating). 
Whichever may be the case, access to loans, which is broadly 
determined by price and non-price conditions, will be more 
r estri cted  than  ear li er .  The  co nseq uence  o f  this  is  that  an 
analysis should consider both interest rate statistics and the 
credit conditions imposed by banks.
Credit supply
Banks may tighten non-price credit conditions for a variety 
of reasons. The lending surveys conducted by central banks 
usually cite two groups of reasons for tightening: lending 
ability and willingness to lend; in other words, how much 
banks can lend and how much they want to lend. As the 
majority of credit institutions in the Central and Eastern 
European region are in foreign ownership and often obtain 
funding through their parent banks, two additional factors 
are added to those described above; namely the parent 
banks’ lending ability and their willingness to lend. 
According to the empirical evidence presented by De Haas-
Van Lelyveld (2008), the allocation of resources to 
subsidiaries in international bank groups is also based on 
the specific country’s status relative to the market of other 
subsidiary countries and the parent bank. For our purposes 
this implies that parent banks’ willingness to lend is not 
o n l y  d e t e r m i n e d  b y  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t s  t a k i n g  p l a c e  i n  a  
specific country, but also by changes in its relative status to 
other markets.
A bank’s lending ability can depend on three factors: the 
banks’ capital position, access to market finance and 
liquidity constraints. These are generally interrelated: 
indeed, if a bank is unable to raise sufficient capital from the 
market to sustain its lending activity, there are reasonable 
grounds to assume that it also has limited access to market 
finance. However, the above constraints may also arise 
separately: a bank might be well capitalised – owing to the 
high profitability it has enjoyed in recent years, for instance 
– but may still face a shortage of funds, or certain liquidity 
t e n s i o n s  m a y  i m p e d e  i t s  a b i l i t y  t o  l e n d  e v e n  i n  c a s e  o f  
sufficient capital adequacy and funding.3
A bank’s willingness to lend is a more subjective element, 
which we believe reflects the bank’s risk appetite, and may 
be basically associated with certain portfolio segments 
(indeed, if a bank reduces its lending to a certain clientele, 
c e t e r i s  p a r i b u s ,  i t  s h o u l d  r e g i s t e r  g r o w t h  i n  o t h e r  
instruments). Thus, as it relates to corporate lending, 
willingness to lend implies that even if sufficient funds are 
a v a i l a b l e ,  a  b a n k  w i l l  m a k e  a  d e c i s i o n  a s  t o  w h i c h  
customers it prefers to finance: companies or other clients. 
Banks’ willingness to lend combines profitability and risk 
2   We may view this as an attempt on the banks’ part to break down the aggregate credit market into more homogenous market segments aligned around non-price 
credit condiotions.
3   For example, the foreign currency liquidity problems arising from the swap market freeze-up observed after October 2008 deteriorated Hungarian banks’ ability to 
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considerations: most of the time, higher profitability may 
not be achieved without higher exposure, and a worsening 
of either of these two factors, ceteris paribus, will translate 
into a decline in willingness to lend. In a recessionary 
environment the economic indicators of firms applying for 
bank loans deteriorate in general, which means that less 
firms will be granted a loan even if the loan approval 
conditions remain the same (this is also known as the 
corporate balance sheet channel of supply adjustment). If 
it is combined with a decline in banks’ risk appetite, banks 
may even tighten their previous non-price conditions, 
whereby access to loans will be limited to clients whose 
c r e d i t w o r t h i n e s s  i s  b e t t e r  t h a n  t h a t  o f  p r e v i o u s  c l i e n t s  
(this is also known as the bank lending channel). It is a 
generally accepted phenomenon that in times of economic 
recession banks, owing to their pro-cyclical behaviour, 
reduce their willingness to lend; however, it is very hard to 
define exactly what influences the extent of this reduction 
and when, as it largely depends on the – subjective – 
expectations and judgement of banks’ policy-makers. 
According to the empirically verified “institutional 
memory” hypothesis set up by Berger–Udell (2003), 
experiences relating to losses sustained may influence 
banks’ willingness to lend: the more vivid their memories 
of such losses are, the less inclined to extend loans banks’ 
policy-makers tend to be.
Credit demand
The literature refers to interest rate levels and economic 
growth as the most important variables affecting demand 
(B e r n an k e–B l i n d e r ,  1 9 8 7 ;  C al z aa  e t  al . ,  2 0 0 3  an d  L o wn–
Morgan, 2004). In addition to macro-variables, developments 
in individual loan applications are analysed as well (depending 
on availability) (Jimenez et al., 2010; Puri et al., 2009), while 
others attempt to proxy demand by the credit demand 
perceived by senior loan officers based on the lending surveys 
of central banks (Calani et al., 2010; Ciccarelli et al., 2010). 
Certain firms do not even approach banks with their loan 
applications on the assumption that they would be rejected 
anyway, which poses a characteristic problem in the 
examination of individual loan applications. This phenomenon 
was observed far more often in the CEE region during the 
period preceding the crisis, even though a significant portion 
of those firms would have been creditworthy (Brown et al., 
2010 and Popov–Udell, 2010).
Moreover, another difficulty hindering the analysis of credit 
demand and credit supply is the endogeneity between the 
credit market and the real economy. This means that it is 
not only macroeconomic changes that influence credit 
demand and credit supply, but in turn credit demand and 
credit supply also influence other macroeconomic variables. 
(In essence, this is known as the credit channel of monetary 
transmission, see Bernanke–Getler, 1995.) For example, 
firms may postpone their investment projects in view of the 
deteriorating income prospects and reduce their credit 
demand accordingly, which, in turn, may further decrease 
production. Therefore, when GDP is used as an explanation 
for credit market dev elopments, we should keep in mind 
that credit market processes may also influence GDP.
DEVELOPMENTS IN BANKS’ CORPORATE 
LOAN PORTFOLIO4 IN THE CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPEAN REGION
In 2007 and 2008 – before the crisis – corporate lending 
increased by 24 percent on average in the Central and 
Eastern European countries under review, while certain 
countries saw a significantly higher credit expansion 
(Bulgaria and Romania recorded growth of 50 percent and 
34 percent, respectively). These fast dynamics also reflected 
the real economic convergence of these countries, as the 
ratio of corporate indebtedness to GDP in converging 
countries falls well behind the Western European average. 
(In 2008, the outstanding amount of corporate loans as a 
percentage of GDP was 60 percent on average in the 
examined countries, while this ratio was 80 percent in 
Western Europe). Similarly to the dynamic credit growth 
observed before the crisis, the significant contraction in 
lending during the crisis was a relatively universal 
phenomenon across the region. The one or two months 
following October 2008 saw the beginning of a steady – and 
in many cases still ongoing – decline in lending to the 
corporate sector (see Chart 1). In a regional comparison, 
Hungary, the Baltic States and the Czech Republic 
experienced a far more severe downturn than Poland or 
Slovakia, where the decline was somewhat more moderate. 
In contrast, Bulgaria and Romania appear to be exceptions. 
According to the official statistics, lending to the corporate 
sector in Bulgaria has increased slightly since October 2008, 
while Romania reached a turning point and the loan 
portfolio started to expand in June 2009.
4   In addition to bank loans, firms may finance their operations through bond issuance, financial corporations (leasing companies, factoring companies, etc.) or through 
foreign loans (via parent companies or non-resident banks). Our analysis focuses on domestic bank loans as we believe that of the data available, these are the most 
reliable indicators of developments in the financing of resident non-financial corporations. The weight of the corporate bond market and the lending provided by 
financial corporations are negligible in the region. Regarding foreign loans, information would be needed in respect of the net external debt position, as in many 
cases foreign loans do not imply an actual financing within the country; instead, those funds are passed on through the regional centres operating in the specific 
country, thus, rather than financing domestic economic activities, they merely expand the financial account of a country on both the assets and liabilities sides. Due 
to data shortcomings we are unable to generate these data series for most countries under review. MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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I n  t e r m s  o f  m a t u r i t y  s t r u c t u r e ,  d e v e l o p m e n t s  p o i n t  t o  a  
greater decline in short-term loans in most countries – 
including Hungary – which also reflects the fact that due to 
the shorter maturity both the banking sector and the 
corporate sector were able to adjust more easily in these 
countries. Nevertheless, a significant decline was observed 
for even longer-term loans – mostly investment loans – in 
the Baltic States and Hungary, a development not typical 
elsewhere in the region. As regards the denomination of 
loans, the outstanding amount of loans extended in domestic 
currency declined steeply in the Baltic States (where foreign 
currency lending was predominant), while a substantial 
contraction was seen in Romania and Hungary as well. In 
the rest of the countries, the ratio of foreign currency 
denominated products remained largely unchanged within 
the total corporate loan portfolio.
At the same time, as we pointed out in the Introduction, 
these figures should be treated with great caution, as the 
indicators of certain countries might be significantly 
distorted by unique phenomena and statistical issues:
•  In the Czech Republic, for instance, according to the 
Stability Report published by the central bank,5 to a 
certain degree, firms substituted bank loans with 
foreign loans (through parent banks) and to a lesser 
extent, by bond issuance; thus, the deterioration in the 
financing position of the corporate sector was less 
severe than the contraction in corporate lending of 
banks would suggest.
•  Turning to Romania, before December 2009, part of FX 
loans to Romanian firms was extended directly by parent 
banks primarily for regulatory reasons – i.e. the high 
reserve requirements on foreign currency deposits. This 
regulation was relaxed in 2009, which may have 
contributed to the expansion of the loan portfolio from 
January 2010 through the retransfer of Romanian 
corporate loan portfolios by parent banks.
•  Bulgaria has also experienced regulation-related distortions: 
during the boom period regulation limited the growth of 
banks’ balance sheet total. Several credit institutions 
responded by outsourcing their loans to special purpose 
vehicles. During the crisis banks reallocated a substantial 
amount of loans in their balance sheets, which increased 
the outstanding amount of loans in the statistics even 
though lending to private sector did not improve in reality. 
However, information is not available regarding the volume 
of the reallocated loans and the distribution between the 
household and corporate segment.
Although such information is not available in respect of 
other countries, we cannot rule out the existence of similar 
unique factors.
WHAT CONCLUSIONS CAN BE DRAWN 
FROM THE DEVELOPMENTS IN INTEREST 
RATES IN THE REGION?
The onset of the crisis led to an increase in the interest rate 
spread6 on corporate loans in every country, but to differing 
degrees (see Chart 2). In respect of loans denominated in local 
currency, Romania recorded the highest interest rate spread as 
well as the steepest crisis-related increase, while in the Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Poland the increase of interest rate 
spreads was more moderate and started from lower levels. As 
for Hungary, in the pre-crisis period interest rate spread moved 
more or less in tandem with those recorded in the Visegrad 
countries; however, as a result of a sharp increase triggered by 
the crisis the Hungarian interest rate spread diverged from the 
others. Although the difference in the spread has somewhat 
decreased since the end of 2009, the level of the Hungarian 
premium still markedly stands out among the premia observed 
in other Visegrad countries. Interest rate spreads for euro-
denominated loans also increased in every country in the wake 
of the crisis; however, the Hungarian interest rate spread was 
one of the lowest in the region both before the crisis and since.
Chart 1
Changes in the outstanding amount of corporate 
loans (October 2008=100) in the CEE region
Source: National central banks.
Note: In the case of countries marked with * we adjusted for exchange rate 
effects; in the rest of the cases this was unnecessary due to the exchange 
rate regime or the use of euro. BG (Bulgaria), CZ (Czech Republic), EE 
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5 http://www.cnb.cz/en/financial_stability/fs_reports/fsr_2009-2010/index.html.
6 Defined as the difference between the annualised average interest rate on recently disbursed loans and the relevant three-month interbank benchmark rate.MNB BULLETIN • OCTOBER 2010 21
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Chart 2
Interest rate spread on new loan volumes denominated in euro and local currency in the CEE region
Source: National central banks.
Note: Interest rates smoothed by three-month moving averages.
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Chart 3
Relation between the interest rate spread change and corporate lending contraction by denomination 
during the crisis
Source: ECB, national central banks.
Note: Exchange rate adjusted data. The change in the interest rate spread is the spread on the average interbank benchmark rate in 2010 and the spread 
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Interest rate developments highlight the special behaviour of 
credit market prices described in Chapter 1. Examining the 
relationship between the foreign currency-denominated loan 
portfolio and interest rates, we find that the smaller the 
c h a n g e  i n  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  p r e m i a  o n  e u r o - d e n o m i n a t e d  
loans, the sharper the decline in the corporate FX loan 
portfolio (see Chart 3). While in a normal market this would 
translate into a decline in demand (surpassing that of supply), 
several signs suggest that this specific case reflects the 
dominant role of supply instead; thus, the moderation in 
prices was merely due to the special characteristics of credit 
markets. Indeed, lending surveys indicate that banks increased 
the premia on riskier loans to a larger extent than average 
premia. Accordingly, if credit conditions are only slightly 
tightened, the decline in the loan portfolio will be more 
moderate, leading to a higher increase in average risk premia. 
Th i s  m i gh t  h a v e  b e e n  t h e  c as e  i n  B u l g ar i a  an d  R o m an i a,  
where the loan portfolio evidently remained unchanged or 
even grew with high and rising interest rate spread (although 
the previously mentioned statistical problems may distort the 
picture). By contrast, with more stringent credit conditions 
only clients with excellent credit rating have access to loans, 
while a great majority of riskier clients will be refused, which 
will keep the interest rate at a low level; however, lending may 
significantly contract even in an improving macroeconomic 
environment. Hungary is in a similar situation: the price at 
which euro loans are offered is one of the cheapest in the 
region, yet the contraction in corporate lending is by far the 
largest. However, Poland is considered an exception, where 
the interest rate spread remained at low levels and the 
outstanding amount of corporate loans did not decrease 
drastically, either.
Looking at domestic currency loans, it is hard to find any 
correlations; however, Lithuania is worth mentioning. In 
this Baltic state corporate lending decreased to the same 
extent as in Hungary, but this steep decline only affected 
loans denominated in the domestic currency (litas). 
According to the Stability Report of the Lithuanian central 
bank, this was a consequence of a considerable surge in the 
interest rates of litas-denominated loans in early 2009, 
subsequently banks priced out litas-denominated loans from 
the market. According to the lending survey presented 
b e l o w ,  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  b a n k s  
significantly tightened their non-price conditions as well. 
The drastically subdued bank supply, which practically 
eliminated all litas-denominated lending, reflected fears 
regarding a potential fall in Lithuania’s exchange rate 
regime, which pegs the litas to the euro. From the perspective 
of banks, this would have inflated litas-denominated loans.7 
NON-PRICE CREDIT CONDITIONS
Turning to the non-price credit conditions, in the five 
countries of the CEE region where lending surveys8 are 
conducted, indicators of corporate credit conditions exhibit 
rather similar developments: starting from around 2007, an 
increasingly severe tightening cycle was observed in all of 
the countries, which continued, albeit with a slight 
moderation, even after its peak at the end of 2008 (see 
Chart 4). Of the five countries presented, banks broadly 
indicated tightening in Lithuania, Latvia and Hungary, 
which appears to be consistent with the extent of the decline 
in corporate lending.
By contrast, in Romania and Poland – which are among the 
countries reporting the slightest decline – the ratio of banks 
reporting tightening was significantly smaller. As mentioned 
earlier from the evolution of prices could not be determined 
unambiguously whether the low interest rate level and the 
strong decline can be attributed to a negative demand shock 
or a supply shock. However, in the case of Lithuania, Latvia 
and Hungary, the lending survey confirms that, with low 
interest rate levels, non-price credit conditions played a 
predominant role, and suggests that changes in banks’ credit 
supply had a strong impact on corporate lending.
Chart 4
Changes in corporate credit conditions 
(net percentage of banks reporting tightening/easing)
Source: National central banks.
Note: The chart does not indicate the magnitude of tightening/easing, only 
the direction. The chart indicates changes relative to the previous quarter; 


























































































7   There was no such threat in the case of foreign currency loans: thanks to the fixed exchange rate regime, Lithuanian regulations – in contrast to those in Hungary – do 
not require banks to hedge their euro positions.
8   In lending surveys, rather than providing a general assessment of the market, loan officers reply to questions on the developments in demand/credit conditions from 
the perspective of their own banks. It should be noted that conclusions cannot be drawn from the data of the lending survey with respect to the level of demand/
credit conditions or the extent of the change, as that information merely reflects qualitative changes. Accordingly, cross-sectional comparison among individual 
countries should be interpreted with reservations.mnb bulletin • october 2010 23
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DemanD-siDe factors baseD on the 
lenDing survey
as  regards  the  demand  side,  the  lending  surveys  show  a 
much  less  homogenous  picture  as  in  the  case  of  credit 
supply. respondents in poland did not perceive a material 
decline in demand; in fact, some banks experienced growth 
(see table 1), which is consistent with the developments in 
corporate  lending  and  macroeconomic  performance. 
corporate  credit  demand  subsided  in  the  rest  of  the 
countries. by contrast, in Hungary the demand for loans – 
primarily  for  working  capital  loans  –  steadily  increased 
from quarter to quarter during the crisis, while demand for 
long-term loans declined. this suggests that demand did not 
play a predominant role in the development of lending, in 
view of the fact that the portfolio of working capital loans 
decreased significantly as well. this phenomenon may be 
attributed  to  the  fact  that,  owing  to  the  poor  economic 
performance, the pre-crisis period saw a stagnating demand 
in  Hungary,  while  demand  steadily  increased  during  the 
same period in other countries in the region thanks to good 
economic  performance.  We  may  conclude  that  in  other 
countries of the region banks perceived a decline from a 
higher demand level. Furthermore, due to the peculiarities 
of the lending survey, paradoxically, supply constraints may 
also account for the growth in demand in Hungary. indeed, 
if supply constraints exist or strengthen, firms are forced to 
turn to more banks in an attempt to secure a loan, which 
banks perceive as an increase in demand.
Developments in macroeconomic 
factors in the region
the recession hitting developed countries spread rapidly to 
the predominantly small, open economies of central and 
eastern europe. Firms postponed their investment projects 
or  cut  back  their  production  activity,  which  inevitably 
reduced demand for loans. the only exception was poland; 
the only economy in the region, in fact in the eu, to register 
growth  in  gDp  even  in  2009.  this  can  be  primarily 
attributed to the fact that poland is a less open economy 
with sufficiently large domestic market. a loose connection 
can be discerned at the macro level between the fall in gDp 
and the contraction in corporate lending (see chart 5), and 
a similar co-movement can be observed with the changes in 
industrial production and export dynamics. in accordance 
with  the  relation,  the  baltic  states  –  which  were  hit 
particularly  hard  by  the  recession  –  were  among  the 
countries  which  experienced  the  largest  contraction  in 
lending, while poland is among those with a more moderate 
decline  in  lending.  remarkably,  developments  in  lending 
and  economic  growth  are  much  more  diverse  in  new 
member states than in the euro area, where credit demand 
countries 2007–2008 Q2 2008 h2 2009 2010 h1
Poland Increase Increase Unchanged Increase
Lithuania Increase Decrease Decrease Decrease
Romania  - Increase Decrease Decrease
Slovakia Increase Decrease Decrease -
Latvia Unchanged Decrease Decrease -
Hungary 
Total Unchanged Increase Increase Increase
Investment loans - Decrease Decrease Increase
table 1
  change in perceived demand – net percentage balance of banks reporting increase and decrease 
Source: National central banks.
Note: the table does not indicate the magnitude of tightening/easing, only the direction. It indicates changes relative to the previous quarter; the level of 
demand is unknown.
chart 5
relation between gDp growth rate and corporate 
lending contraction (exchange rate adjusted) during 
the crisis in the cee region
Source: Eurostat, ECB, national central banks.
Note: For the Czech Republic, the chart indicates an estimate, taking into 
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captured through the economic growth apparently played a 
negligible role in the development of lending.
However, in some countries macroeconomic fundamentals 
do not explain adequately the extent of the decline in 
corporate lending. For example, in Hungary – despite the 
average severity of the recession – lending to the corporate 
sector declined to a similar extent as in the Baltic States; in 
fact, Hungary recorded a substantial fall in the outstanding 
amount even in the first half of 2010, at a time when 
macroeconomic conditions had already started to improve.9 
By contrast, we do not see a similarly pronounced drop in 
lending either in Romania or in Bulgaria – despite the fact 
that they faced a similarly deep recession as Hungary – 
although this may partly reflect the statistical issues 
indicated above.10
In summary, based on the demand indicators it appears that 
credit demand may have contributed significantly to the 
decline in corporate lending in most of the regional 
countries as well (while in Lithuania the domestic currency 
loans suffered a negative supply shock, waning demand may 
have played an equally significant role in the contraction in 
total corporate lending). By contrast, changes in credit 
d e m a n d  a p p e a r  t o  b e  l e s s  r e l e v a n t  i n  t h e  c o n t r a c t i o n  i n  
Hungary, which suggests that supply constraints were more 
dominant here in regional comparison.
POSSIBLE REASONS FOR SUPPLY 
CONSTRAINTS
The fact that a large part of the banking sector is controlled 
by non-resident parent banks and that banks turn to their 
parent banks for capital and, in most cases, external funds, 
renders an analysis of regional banks’ credit supply rather 
difficult. Consequently, subsidiaries’ lending ability (which 
can be captured relatively well by different indicators) and 
their (more subjective) willingness to lend also depend on 
the parent banks’ risk appetite and lending ability. While 
subsidiary and parent bank elements can be separated 
reasonably well in the case of lending ability (on the basis of 
financial indicators), group control renders this practically 
impossible in the case of willingness to lend, and – owing to 
the group level allocation of capital and resources – it is 
extremely difficult to separate the subsidiary’s lending 
ability from the parent banks’ willingness to lend. The latter 
problem is clearly illustrated by the connection between the 
capital adequacy of the banking systems and the decline in 
corporate lending. Although data suggest that banks’ capital 
adequacy (see Table 2) was higher in the countries (for 
example, Romania and Bulgaria) where balance sheet 
statistics indicate a lesser decline – or none at all – in 
corporate lending, the causality is not entirely clear. 
Conceivably, a better capital position may have contributed 
to banks’ less restrained credit supply in these countries, or 
parent banks may have allocated more capital to them with 
the intention of increasing their lending there (or they 
attempted to prepare for an increase in corporate loan 
portfolios in view of the regulatory reasons referred to 
above). 
Considering subsidiaries’ lending ability, it appears that the 
decline in corporate lending was less pronounced in banking 
systems with a lower loan-to-deposit ratio (see Chart 6), 
while in Hungary and the Baltic States – where a modest 
deposit portfolio combined with significant credit growth 
drove the loan-to-deposit ratio well above 100 percent11 – 
there was higher pressure for adjustment on the asset side. 
Additionally, the importance of internal funding increased 
during the crisis due to the decrease – with the exception of 
Poland and Hungary – in external funding (see Table 4).12 
In the Baltic States the decrease in external funding was 
consistent with the decline in the outstanding amount of 
loans to the domestic private sector. In Bulgaria and 
Romania, however, the decline in external funds did not hit 
banks very hard, because the outflows were partly offset by 
the increase in the stock of domestic deposits. 
At first sight, the situation of Hungary in this respect looks 
paradoxical: despite the fact that the banking sector did 
not experience a decrease in external funding, the decline 
in the corporate lending was far more substantial in 
Hungary than in other regional countries. However, this 
had a technical reason: amid swap market turbulences, 
domestic banks reduced their swap portfolios vis-à-vis 
non-residents during the crisis, thus – despite the abundant 
forint liquidity of Hungarian banks – non-resident parent 
banks were unable to reduce their foreign currency funds 
in their subsidiaries, because this would have led to a 
widening of domestic banks’ foreign currency position in 
9 The substitution between bank lending and other funding sources cannot be observed in Hungary: the external funding of regionally active firms were subsequently 
transferred to another country, which increased the total corporate outstanding amount both on the liabilities and on the assets side.
10   As it relates to the parent bank’s side of lending ability: the financial indicators of parent banks do not reveal any significant differences between individual countries 
(see Table 2). The Tier 1 rates of parent banks varied between 10 percent and 10.5 percent in most countries, with the exception of Latvia and Lithuania, which 
recorded a rate under 10 percent in 2009.
11   In addition, the share of foreign currency loans is higher in these countries, increasing their vulnerability.
12   The impact of this was less substantial in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where external funds play a negligible role in the financing of banks, which is clearly 
illustrated by the fact that the loan-to-deposit ratio is below 100 percent in both countries.MNB BULLETIN • OCTOBER 2010 25
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their balance sheets.13 Accordingly – unlike in other 
countries of the region – in the balance sheet of the 
Hungarian banking sector the decline in private sector 
lending was primarily offset by an increase in central bank 
bonds on the asset side (resulting in abundant forint 
liquidity), rather than a decrease on the liabilities side (in 
particular, in external funds).
Turning to banks’ willingness to lend, group-based control 
m a k e s  i t  u n n e c e s s a r y  t o  e x a m i n e  p a r e n t  b a n k s ’  a n d  
subsidiaries’ willingness separately. Following the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers, willingness to lend was primarily 
d e t e r m i n e d  b y  r i s k  a v e r s i o n .  A l t h o u g h  t h e  c r e d i t  l o s s e s  
suffered by Lithuania and Latvia – which were rather severe 
even in regional comparison – may have contributed to the 
substantial downturn observed in corporate lending, 
interestingly enough we cannot discern a connection 
between lending and portfolio quality or the rate of 
portfolio deterioration in the other countries under review 
(see Table 2). Therefore we may infer that there is not a 
strong correlation between banks’ risk appetite and the 
actual losses they sustained. Apparently, foreign investors’ 
and owners’ risk perception was determined by general 
(subjective) concerns about the vulnerability of the specific 
economy and its reliance on external funds, factors which 
are best captured by the net external debt of a country (see 
Chart 6). At the same time, this also implies that the severe 
public indebtedness may have significantly deteriorated the 
risk perception of Hungarian banks and the economy.
CONCLUSIONS
As pointed out in the reports published by regional central 
banks, demand and – as a result of a more stringent lending 
policy – supply both contributed to the deceleration observed 
in the credit growth rate. Beyond this, it is hard to identify 
Chart 6
Relation between the loan-to-deposit ratio/net external debt and corporate lending contraction during the 
crisis (exchange rate adjusted) in the CEE region
Source: National central banks, IFS, Eurostat.
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13   Unlike their peers operating in a fixed exchange rate regime, Hungarian banks resorted primarily to the swap market to hedge the open foreign currency positions 
stemming from foreign currency lending. Consequently, the external foreign currency requirement of the Hungarian banking sector was much higher during the 
pre-crisis period than indicated by the on-balance sheet statistics (swaps are off-balance sheet items). In the wake of the crisis, however, the forint requirement of 
non-residents abated, and it was more difficult for Hungarian banks to find foreign partners willing to swap foreign currency against the forint. For this reason, 
domestic credit institutions reduced their swap portfolios. Accounting for this decrease, similarly to other countries in the region, Hungarian banks’ external funding 
decreased as well.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
MNB BULLETIN • OCTOBER 2010 26
and quantify the role of demand and supply. Relying on 
aggregate statistics and a simple analysis framework, in our 
analysis we have attempted to determine which countries of 
the region may have had stronger credit supply constraints in 
addition to waning demand. Based on the factors affecting 
supply and demand and the findings of the lending surveys 
we may conclude that banks’ credit supply constraints may 
have contributed more in countries where the corporate 
lending declined dramatically. Banks’ supply behaviour 
appears to reflect a country’s vulnerability and reliance on 
external funds, factors which had a negative impact both on 
risk appetite due to high net external indebtedness and on 
lending ability due to high loan-to-deposit ratios. Accordingly, 
the higher a country’s net external indebtedness was, the less 
inclined non-resident investors and owners were to provide 
additional funds to the country’s banks – and hence, 
companies. This holds especially true to Hungary, where the 
decline in lending was far more significant than would be 
explained – based on regional comparison – by the recession 
o f  t h e  r e a l  e c o n o m y ,  o r  w o u l d  b e  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  
corporate credit demand indicated by the lending surveys. 
Thus, the shrinking credit supply may have contributed more 
significantly to the decline in corporate lending in Hungary. 
Consequently, low interest rate premia and a pronounced 
contraction in lending suggest that supply constraints prevent 
riskier clients from obtaining loans, and limit the access to 
loans only to corporate clients with a high credit rating. 
However, the applied analytical framework is not suitable for 
determining exact measures (or impacts); moreover, in view 
of the comparability problems of regional data and statistical 
distortions, our findings should be interpreted with due 
caution.
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ROA Tier 1 ratio Tier 1 ratio 
(parent banks)
NPL Change in NPL 
2008–May 2010
Bulgaria 126 1.1 17.5 10.6 8.2 9.0
Czech Republic 75 1.4 17.2 10.3 5.7 2.8
Hungary 143 1.7 11.9 10.4 7.4 4.4
Estonia 190 –3.4 9.4 10.4 4.1 2.8
Latvia 255 –4.0 10.8 8.6 19.6 15.2
Lithuania 169 –3.9 8.0 9.4 4.6 14.7
Poland 105 0.8 12.1 10.0 8.0 4.7
Romania 118 0.5 12.9 10.0 11.6 9.2
Slovakia 87 0.5 11.6 10.4 5.4 4.0
Euro area 107 0.2 10.1 – 4.2 2.0
Table 2
  Banking system indicators at the end of 2009
Source: ECB, autonomous research, Bankscope.
Note: NPL indicates below average, doubtful or bad loans (loans expected to generate losses). Exceptions: For Slovakia it contains loans with a 
delinquency of over 90 days. For Bulgaria it contains restructured loans and loans which generated losses. 
Corporate loans by 
banks 
(as a percentage 
of GDP)
Corporate loans total 










Bulgaria 46 120 75.3 58.1 49.6
Czech Republic 21 41 18.1 8.2 15.2
Hungary 27 67 57.7 64.5 14.9
Estonia 52 47 91.5 86.9 15.9
Latvia 50 75 94.4 92.2 23.2
Lithuania 35 46 74.9 73.4 24.0
Poland 15 36 23.7 32.8 25.3
Romania 20 48 59.5 60.3 33.7
Slovakia 22 28 2.4 1.1 17.1
Euro area 52 74 n.a. n.a. 10.0
Table 3
  Credit aggregates at the end of 2009
Source: ECB, Eurostat, national central banks.MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK








Change in external 
liabilities (as a 









Change in private 
sector deposits (as a 
percentage of total 
liabilities)
Bulgaria 26.2 19.8 –6.4 52.9 55.7 2.8
Czech Republic 9.8 8.1 –1.7 55.9 58.8 2.9
Hungary 25.4 26.1 0.7 35.8 35.2 –0.6
Estonia 43.4 40.5 –3.0 34.4 38.6 4.2
Latvia 58.6 49.3 –9.3 23.8 26.5 2.7
Lithuania 45.8 36.3 –9.5 38.3 42.5 4.2
Poland 14.9 15.6 0.7 52.9 54.5 1.6
Romania 29.7 26.3 –3.4 44.2 46.6 2.4
Slovakia 4.6 3.9 –0.7 52.4 61.9 9.5
Euro area 15.0 13.7 –1.3 29.3 31.6 2.3
Source: ECB, national central banks.
Table 4
  Liabilities side of banking systems in the CEE region